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Excerpt from the Hippocratic Oath
“…into whatever home I shall enter, it shall be for the good of the sick and of the well
and….I will exercise my art solely for the cure of my patients and for the preventions of
disease.”
Taken from the Hippocratic Oath used by LSUHSC School of Medicine
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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss historical and current rates of preventable medical
errors (PMEs), their causes, and methods used to reduce them. I will also provide
recommendations that I believe can help reduce the number of injuries and deaths that result
from them. Data and information used in this thesis were drawn from a variety of sources.
While the large majority was sourced from articles in academic journals, government health
reports, Federal Flight Administration documents, phone interviews, and personal experiences in
the medical field also provided invaluable information.
To summarize, there are two major types of preventable medical errors: structural errors
and process errors. The first group involves errors that arise from issues with the structure of the
medical facility (e.g. staff or equipment availability), while the second involve the commission
or omission of some action by the healthcare provider (e.g. prescribing the wrong drug vs. failing
to prescribe a drug at all). These error scan arise from a variety of different sources, but the
primary ones are physician inattentiveness, complexity of a procedure, inexperienced healthcare
providers, and breakdown in communication. Recommendations to combat these specific
causes, as well as recommendations to improve patient safety overall include standardization of
the entire medical industry, implementation of an anonymous reporting system, and increased
education of medical personnel.
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Section I
Introduction
Six sigma and other quality control principles have been used to reduce error rates
within manufacturing facilities to sometimes near infinitesimal levels. Alternatively,
when lives are at stake within hospital settings, between 40,000 and 98,000 persons die
annually from mishaps within these settings (IOM, 2000, p. 1). For several years now, the
Joint Association for Accreditation of Hospital Organizations has been addressing
specific safety issues and is attempting to follow patients through the whole entry-to-exit
hospital process, similar to how individual items in a manufacturing process are followed
during six sigma analysis. Using such a method is completely understandable: while
error rates in manufacturing are generally around three incidents per million items, fatal
errors in medicine occur at a rate of almost 3,000 per million patients. To put the severity
of this issue into the more familiar context of the aviation industry (which also has a low
six sigma error rate of three per million), a loaded Boeing 737 would have to crash every
single day to achieve similar annual fatality levels (Gudewicz, interview, February 27,
2015). As a nation, we would such a thing as completely unacceptable, but it receives
little attention when it happens in medicine.
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The primary reason for this startling difference is that people expect to board a
flight and arrive at their destination safely and on time; they are shocked when an
accident happens that results in injury or death. In comparison, when individuals enter a
hospital, some experience anxiety or distress, which is surprising given that hospitals are
meant to be places of healing.
The central purpose of this thesis is to consider historical and current rates of
preventable medical errors (PMEs), their causes, and the techniques that are used to
reduce them. Additional approaches for lowering these rates via the use of human factors
taken from other industries will also be discussed and proposed. Because one of the main
goals of this thesis is to increase the quality and safety of patient care, it follows that it
would tie in well with the Hippocratic Oath. The Hippocratic Oath, often attributed to
the Classical Greek physician Hippocrates, is an oath that is traditionally taken by
physicians in some form or another. In the original oath, the physician swears by Apollo
to “exercise [his] art solely for the cure of [his] patients and for the preventions of
disease.” I would argue that preventable medical errors and the harm that they cause are
in direct conflict with the tenets of this promise.
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Section II
Background
In the year 2000, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a massive report titled
To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System which sought to call attention to and
reduce rates of Preventable Medical Errors (PMEs). This study acted as a catalyst for a
huge change in the medical industry: referenced over 750 times since its publication, it
has “brought the issues of medical error and patient safety to the forefront of national
concern” (Mahn-DiNicola, 2004, p. 3).
Rates
According to the IOM’s report, “at least 44,000 and perhaps as many as 98,000
Americans die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors.” To put these numbers
in context, the low end of the estimate would have ranked as the 8th leading cause of
death at the time, beating out motor vehicle accidents (at 43,458), breast cancer (at
42,297), and AIDS (at 16,516) (IOM, 2001, p. 1). An article in the Pennsylvania Nurse
puts the total economic cost of these errors in the $17 to $29 billion dollar range
(Weingarten, 2013, p. 4). Breaking down these numbers even further, the IOM estimates
that 7,000 deaths a year are the result of medication errors (defined by the FDA’s website
as “any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or
3

patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional, patient,
or consumer”). These deaths could cost as much as $2 billion dollars (IOM, 2000, p. 2).
It is important to note that medication errors include patients both inside and outside of
hospitals; additionally, medication errors can take place during prescribing by physicians,
dispensing by pharmacists, and even consumption by patients. Finally, the IOM suggests
that “medication errors have the potential to increase as a major contributor to avoidable
morbidity and mortality as new medications are introduced for a wider range of
indications” (IOM, 2000, p. 27). Although it seems counterintuitive, this situation occurs
because as the number of medications used by physicians increases, the risk of
unforeseen interactions among them also increases. Incidentally, potentially harmful
interactions among different medications are the reason why doctors ask patients about
their current medication regimes.
Types
PMEs can be classified in a variety of ways, but the two broadest categories are
structural errors and process errors. The first category, that of structural errors, involves
problems such as “availability of staff or equipment” (Pucher et al., 2013, p. 1); these
errors can be expensive to correct (with regard to hiring new personnel or purchasing new
equipment) or require massive reorganization of how current resources are scheduled.
For example, a study published in the Journal of Internal and Emergency Medicine in
October of 2011 found that patients who were admitted to Emergency Departments in the
highest quartile of crowding “had [greater than] twofold increased odds of experiencing a
4

PME relative to patients whose average crowding exposure was in the lowest quartile”
(Epstein et al, 2011, p.177.).
Emergency Department overcrowding, like most structural errors, has no simple
fix. If the department is understaffed, additional human resources, such as doctors or
nurses, must be brought in to ease the load, which will increase costs associated with
hiring, training, and paying new employees. If the department is simply too small, one of
two undesirable endeavors must be undertaken: either a massive renovation to expand the
facilities could take place, or excess patients must be sent to a hospital potentially further
from the site of their emergency. The first alternative would leave the Emergency
Department functioning at less than full capacity for the duration of the renovation,
exacerbating the original problem of overcrowding (not to mention requiring huge capital
expenditures). The second could delay care for patients desperately in need of it,
potentially violating the Golden Hour of Emergency Medicine (which says that any
patient who arrives to the emergency department within an hour of their accident has a
significantly higher chance of survival). Furthermore, it is only a possibility if there is a
secondary hospital available.
Process errors, on the other hand, involve errors of commission or omission:
essentially, when a healthcare provider either delivers care in an incorrect fashion or fails
to deliver care at all, respectively. Both cases have the potential to cause harm to a
patient; a textbook example would involve the administration of drugs. The
administration of inappropriate drugs, as well as an excessive drug dosage (commission
5

errors), can be just as damaging as the failure to administer appropriate drugs (omission
errors). In Dr. Atul Gawande’s The Checklist Manifesto, he relates an anecdote that
provides a real-life example of an error of commission (pp. 4-6). A healthy, 40 year-old
man was undergoing surgery to remove a tumor in his stomach, and everything was
normal until the cardiac monitor showed that the patient’s heart had stopped completely.
Dr. Gawande paints a graphic picture of the surgeon performing chest compressions
while “patient’s intestines [bulged] in and out of his open abdomen with each push.” In
the meantime, the other members of the surgical team raced to figure out what could have
caused the asystole. After ruling out obvious solutions like massive internal
hemorrhaging (as no blood was visible in the abdominal cavity) and a pneumothorax (a
collapsed lung – no evidence of poor air movement into the lungs was apparent), the team
retraced their steps and discovered that the anesthesiologist had ordered a dose of
potassium to counteract the patient’s low levels. Instead of the appropriate dosage,
however, the anesthesiologist administered a dose that was 100 times what he had
intended and well beyond a lethal dosage. Thankfully, the surgical team was able to
correct this error, and the patient made a full recovery (Gawande, pp. 4-6).
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Section III
Causes and Possible Solutions
While patients can be the cause of their own preventable medical errors (for
example, by failing to inform their physician of allergies or failing to take medication as
prescribed), I am choosing to focus this thesis on errors caused by healthcare providers,
as described above. PMEs can be caused by a wide variety of sources: doctor
inattentiveness, complexity of a medical procedure (that is, more steps allow for more
error opportunities), inexperienced healthcare providers, and failure in communication
(Barger et al, 2006, p. 2442; Gawande, 2009, p. 28; Philips and Barker, 2010, p. 776;
Solet, Norvell, Rutan, & Frankel, 2005, p. 1095; Starner et al, 2013, “Conclusions and
Relevance”)
Doctor Fatigue
With regard to the effects of doctor tiredness, one study found that in months
when medical residents worked five or more extended shifts (shifts in excess of 24
hours), they were significantly more likely to commit PMEs. Residents who participated
in the study were asked to complete a survey that, among other things, asked about the
number of extended-duration shifts that the resident worked, the number of errors they
committed, and their belief about the relationship between those errors and their levels of
7

fatigue. In those months where they worked five or more extended shifts, 16% reported
that lack of sleep caused them to make a significant medical error with 0.4% of those
errors resulting in a fatality. In months with zero extended-duration shifts, only 3.8% of
residents reported that their lack of sleep led to a significant medical error, with 0.1%
resulting in a fatality. Additionally, the survey also collected data regarding residents’
abilities to stay awake during important periods of their day: A.) surgery; B.) patient
examinations; C.) rounds with the attending physician; and D.) during lectures, seminars,
or grand rounds. In months with five or more 24+ hour shifts, residents reported
themselves “nodding off or falling asleep” at rates of A.) 7.4%, B.) 5.4%, C.) 22%, and
D.) 70%; months with zero extended-duration shifts showed rates of A.) 2.8%, B.) 2.8%,
C.) 8.1%, and D.) 46%, respectively. Sleep deprivation in doctors is therefore a multipronged threat to patients. Not only does it directly cause preventable medical errors by
decreasing physician attentiveness, it also causes them indirectly by interfering with
residents’ medical educations (Barger et al, 2006, pp. 2443-2444.).
The obvious way to solve this problem is simply to let residents get more sleep.
In reality, such a solution would require a huge cultural shift in residency programs
nationwide and would most likely be met with resistance from post-residency physicians.
After interviewing Dr. Terry Creel, who is an Emergency Physician in New Orleans, LA,
I have come to realize that surviving a residency program composed of chains of
sleepless nights is not only believed to be a rite of passage for young physicians but also
a point of pride (T. Creel, personal interview, n.d.). In order to counteract this mindset, a
very thorough program should be undertaken to educate more experienced physicians on
8

the dangers of fatigue and sleep deprivation. Such a program would be beneficial not just
to the sleep schedules and patients of residents, as excessive fatigue can also cause
physician burnout. Physician burnout is characterized by “fatigue, exhaustion, inability
to concentrate, depression, anxiety, insomnia, irritability, and sometimes increased use of
alcohol or drugs.” However, the most distinct characteristic “is a loss of interest in one’s
work or personal life, a feeling of ‘just going through the motions’” (Gunderson, 2001, p.
145). The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education issued updated
guidelines that took these issues into account; the maximum number of hours that a
resident could be on shift was lowered from 30 consecutive hours to 16 for a student in
his or her first year following medical school (PGY-1), and the maximum number of inhospital consecutive night floats was set at six (night floats are when interns are placed
totally in charge of patients during an overnight shift) (Desselle & Dawkins, date
unknown, “Overview of the New ACGME Duty Hour Regulations”).
Procedure Complexity
The level of complexity of a medical procedure also plays a huge part in the
number and severity of PMEs. Based upon intuition alone, it should be obvious that
more complex, multistep processes allow more chances for a physician to inadvertently
cause a patient harm. No matter how much time and effort a surgeon invests into
memorizing the steps of a particular surgery, there is always the risk that he or she will
inadvertently miss a minor step that, when left unchecked, could threaten the patient’s
life. To illustrate this complexity, Dr. Gawande uses the case of a three-year-old girl who
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fell into a frozen Alpine lake and was, for all intents and purposes, dead (2009, pp. 1517). Her symptoms included no pulse, lack of respiration, body temperature of 66
degrees Fahrenheit, and unreactive pupils. By working together across multiple
specialties and multiple surgical teams, the girl’s doctors were able to perform the
thousands of steps necessary to bring her back to life.
In order to ease the burden of complexity on physicians, the World Health
Organization (WHO) developed the “Surgical Safety Checklist,” a three part checklist
divided into three sections: Sign In (before induction of anesthesia), Time Out (before
skin incision), and Sign Out (before patient leaves the Operating Room). Before delving
into deeper discussion on the WHO’s checklist, it is necessary to stress the fact that it is
not designed to be a comprehensive checklist; too many variations exist between the
hundreds of different surgical procedures for it to even attempt to be such a guide.
Instead, the checklist is designed “to provide reminders of only the most critical and
important steps—the ones that even the highly skilled professionals using them could
miss”; simply put, the checklist is not meant to be the definitive guide to a surgery
(Gawande, 2009, 120). These critical steps can be forecasted by using a Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis (Gudewicz). This process (normally used in manufacturing)
involves breaking a procedure down into smaller components. Each component is then
analyzed for potential failures, and the magnitude of each failure is assessed.
Contingency plans are developed based upon the results of this analysis and the
likelihood and severity of each outcome.
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Another key feature of the Surgical Safety Checklist is that users are encouraged
to adapt it to their own needs, so long as the product remains in line with its original goal.
While it is not enough on its own to stop Preventable Medical Errors, the checklist can be
used as part of a larger “Swiss Cheese” model of error mitigation. The reasoning behind
this idea is that each layer of defense against errors is like a slice of Swiss cheese: mostly
solid, but with a few holes or gaps where errors can get through. By stacking multiple
layers of defense together, a single impenetrable layer of defense can be created out of
individual, permeable layers (Collins, Newhouse, Porter, & Talsma, 2014, p. 67).
Inexperience
Another cause of PMEs arises from inexperienced physicians. No matter how
thorough medical schools attempt to be, they cannot hope to cover every possible
scenario that a physician will encounter. As a result, residents will meet patients that
they are not fully prepared to treat, even with the supervision of an attending physician,
leading to the “July Effect.” All graduates from medical schools in the United States
begin their respective residencies in the month of July, which apparently correlates and
coincides with the number of some adverse events (including deaths) at teaching
hospitals in July. For example, one study found that there was, on average, a 10%
increase in fatalities in July attributable to medication errors in teaching hospitals (Philips
and Barker, 2010, p. 774). While there is no direct evidence linking the residents to the
increased fatalities, it is worth noting that no other month had any significant statistical
differences.
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Overcoming physician inexperience is probably the hardest way to go about
reducing error rates by virtue of the fact that the only way to overcome inexperience is
with experience. Solutions like simulation labs, mock patients, and case studies would
bear looking at, but none of them are as effective as real world experience.
Communication
Breakdowns in communication are yet another source of preventable medical
errors. Miscommunications can occur between two physicians or healthcare providers
during a patient handoff, between a physician and the patient (or patient’s family), or
even between a healthcare provider and the hospital’s record keeping system. Like in the
children’s game “Telephone,” “the more often information is transmitted or
communicated, the more likely it is that there will be distortion or corruption of the
original data” (Solet et al., 1094). The original data can include vital information like the
patient’s name, known allergies, or medication schedules; the effects of this information
deterioration can range from minor administrative headaches to patient injury and even
death. In order to minimize the number of patient handoffs that occur per patient,
physicians work longer hours, leading to increased fatigue. As mentioned before, an
increase in doctor fatigue can lead to a higher risk of PMEs, which may very well cancel
out any benefit that having fewer patient handoffs would have provided, while still
increasing the possibility of physician burnout. Instead, standardization of handoff
procedures seems to be critical to reducing these types of errors. Currently, there are no
nationwide standards for how patient handoffs should be managed. This lack of
12

standardization means that relevant patient information that is exchanged during patient
handoffs can vary among hospitals and even among physicians in the same hospital. One
system that is gaining traction among some hospitals is the I-PASS System. Standing for
Illness severity, Patient summary, Action list, Situation awareness and contingency
planning, and Synthesis by receiver, I-PASS aims to provide a framework within which
transfer can take place more effectively. A brief outline of how a patient handoff would
occur using the I-PASS system is that two physicians would meet prior one physician’s
leaving at the end of his shift. Going patient by patient, they would first discuss a given
patient’s symptoms and diagnosis (illness severity). Next the first physician would give a
brief summary of the patient’s history, including age, allergies, and any other conditions
that the second physician should be aware of (patient summary). The action list involves
suggested actions that the first physician recommends, while the situation awareness and
contingency planning requires both physicians to plan for potential complications that the
patient might face. In the last stage, the second physician repeats the information relayed
to him or her back to the first physician, ensuring that all important details have been
shared (Gudewicz). Starmer et al. found that the use of the I-PASS system resulted in a
30% decrease in preventable medical errors over 10,740 hospital admissions without a
significant negative effect on hospital workflow (2014, “Results”). Essentially, this
handoff standardization allows doctors to handoff patients in a way that reduces errors
without creating delays in patient care.
Included in the issue of standardization of communication is how the patient data
are transferred. Common methods include print-offs from an electronic patient database,
13

word processing templates, and handwritten forms. Each system has its own advantages
and disadvantages, but the handwritten forms tend to be the least informative; oftentimes,
they only include a “single fragmented statement such as ‘50ish yo M with [chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease] – stable,’” if the writing is even legible enough to read
(Solet et. al, 1095). The templates tend to convey more information than handwritten
forms because they have spots for certain necessary information that prompt healthcare
providers to ask certain questions. Still, information can be left out, or typos can occur.
Furthermore, unless additional physical or digital copies are made, there is no backup if
the original is lost. The best method, albeit the most time consuming and expensive, is
one based on a digital database. Once patient information has been stored in the
database, it can be used during subsequent visits to avoid having to retake a patient
history every time. If the hospital is using PDAs instead of physical copies of the data,
patient information can be updated in real time, eliminating the need to track down and
destroy out-of-date copies.
With regard to patient-to-physician and patient’s family-to-physician
communication, communication can go awry in a variety of ways, from linguistic barriers
to knowledge barriers. With the changing demographics of the United States, it is
becoming more and more important for medical doctors to be able to converse in
languages other than English. While most hospitals do offer translation services, either in
person or over the phone, the very act of adding an intermediary can introduce new areas
where errors can occur. Obviously, the risks associated with having no method of
translation far outweigh the risks associated with having even an imperfect one.
14

Even if both the physician and the patient speak the same language, patients might
not be familiar with the reasoning behind a doctor’s line of questioning. For example, in
order to prevent dangerous interactions between prescription medicines, it is vitally
important for a patient to notify his physician of what prescriptions he currently takes.
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, 2014, “Five Steps to Safer
Healthcare”) recommends that patients bring all of their medicines and supplements to
their doctor visits so that the physician can ensure that no dangerous drug interactions can
occur. Another area where it is important for patients and physicians to have open
dialogue is allergies. A patient with no knowledge of his or her own allergies places
himself or herself in a position of undue risk, as many common items in the medical field
can trigger allergic reactions.

Possible Solutions from Aviation
Checklists
Medicine and aviation share several similarities: both industries require years of
training, both involve huge life risks, and both can have cultures characterized by
individual heroism. It is important to note that in many situations, individual heroism
should be welcomed. As noted in Lewis, et al., in the medical field (and primarily with
surgeons) a proclivity towards “[responding] to system deficiencies by finding ways
15

around each problem” is common. For example, “when items of surgical equipment
were missing, surgeons modified, reshaped, or adjusted equipment designed for other
uses,” describing this behavior as “ ‘ adventurous,’ ‘daring,’ and necessary for ‘getting
the job done’” (Lewis, Vaithianathan, Hockey, Hirst, & Bagian, 2011, p. 21). While
these on-the-fly modifications show strong problem solving skills, in a perfect world,
they would be totally unnecessary because system deficiencies would be nonexistent.
In the aviation industry, similar behaviors were once common (probably because
of the prevalence of ‘hot shot’ former military pilots) but have largely been extinguished
via “codification and other measures that downplay the role of individuals in ensuring
safety.” The goal of these efforts is to train pilots and mechanics “to follow set
procedures and to report the problem through official channels” (Lewis et al., 2011, p.
21). One of the primary ways that this was accomplished was through the use of
extensive checklists. In Gawande’s The Checklist Manifesto, he discusses these
checklists: contained in “spiral bound, about two hundred pages long, with numerous
yellow tabs,” they were short (“usually just a few lines on a page”) but thorough enough
that they could collectively account for almost any scenario that a pilot could face.
Usually, when checklists are mentioned, we tend to think of long lists with each step in a
process listed out; like a recipe, but without the anticipation of a cake at the end. These
checklists are suboptimal checklists: they tend to be overly specific, “[turning] people’s
brains off rather than [turning] them on” (Gawande, 2009, p. 115). Instead, they should
be focused on reminding users of the main steps in a process.
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In 2008, the World Health Organization published the “Surgical Safety
Checklist,” a 19-item checklist that is designed to be used in almost any surgery. At first,
it seems ridiculous that all potential complications of all potential surgeries could be held
in check by the information contained on a single sheet of paper. However, its goal is not
to replace a surgeon’s knowledge; rather, the Surgical Safety Checklist aims to “reinforce
accepted safety practices and foster better communication and teamwork between clinical
disciplines.” Each of the 19 items has a firm basis in “clinical evidence or expert
opinion” and has been specifically chosen to “reduce the likelihood of serious, avoidable
surgical harm and that adherence to it is unlikely to introduce injury or unmanageable
cost” (WHO Surgical Safety Checklist Manual, 2008, p. 2). It is also important to note
that the checklist should not be used as a replacement for existing pre-operation
procedures; it should be integrated with existing procedures so as to provide the best fit
for a given organization and a given surgery. In fact, the checklist itself has a note on the
bottom which encourages its users to add to it and to modify it as needed.
Crew Resource Management
Another very successful method used in aviation to counter individual heroism is
Crew Resource Management Training (formerly Cockpit Resource Management; both
abbreviated CRM). The primary goal of CRM is to allow crew members to function “as
an intact team, not simply as a collection of technically competent individuals” (Civil
Aviation Authority, 2002, Chapter 2 page 1). While in normal flight operations, it is not
necessarily important that crew members act as a team; however, the UK’s Civil Aviation
17

Authority points out that “behaviour during normal, routine circumstances can have a
powerful impact on how well the crew as a whole functions during high-workload,
stressful situations” (CAA, 2002, Ch. 2, p. 1). As such, Crew Resource Management
focuses on six distinct areas for crew members (pilots and otherwise) to improve upon.
The first area involves communication and interpersonal skills: those skills
“associated with good communication practices [including] such items as polite
assertiveness and participation, active listening and feedback” (CAA, 2002, Ch. 2, p. 9).
This area focuses on recognizing barriers to communication which can include “rank,
age, and crew position.” By acknowledging and working to minimize the effects of these
barriers, crew members are more able to exercise “polite assertiveness,” allowing them to
feel more confident in their ability to communicate important information, as “a single
hesitant attempt to communicate important data constitutes a failure to discharge
individual responsibility” (CAA, 2002, Ch. 2 p. 9). Carrying this idea over to medicine,
if flight captains are analogous to surgeons, then the remaining crew members (co-pilots
and flight attendants) are roughly equivalent to other operating room personnel (residents
and nurses). Just as it is important for a junior pilot to speak up when he realizes that the
senior pilot has committed a mistake, it is also important for a junior physician (resident)
to speak up when he realizes the surgeon has erred. Not mentioned in the CRM manual
is the significance of mutual respect: an individual who does not feel respected will be
less likely to speak up.
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Another area of Crew Resource Management is situation awareness, referring to
“one’s ability to accurately perceive what is going on in the cockpit and outside the
aircraft. It further extends to the planning of several solutions for any emergency
situation which could occur in the immediate future” (CAA, 2002, Ch. 2, p. 9). By
maintaining this awareness at all times, crew members can not only anticipate what can
go wrong but can also have one or more plans to deal with issues. Adapting situation
awareness to medicine would require little to no change; each surgery has known
inherent risks (some more than others), so it would be a simple matter of recognizing
what tools and equipment are needed as each potential risk approaches. Risks could be
predicted and evaluated using the aforementioned Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.
The third area that Crew Resource Management focuses on is problemsolving/decision-making/judgement. Although it is a broad topic that easily can be
related to the other five, it primarily focuses on how a crew member processes
information into a decision. As information can come from different (potentially
conflicting) sources, it is important that crew members (especially the captain, from
whom all major decisions come) have skills in conflict resolution (CAA, 2002, Ch. 2, p.
9). Similarly, surgeons must be able to make on-the-spot decisions given conflicting
information. In the case of the 40-year-old surgery patient mentioned above, the initial
concerns of a stopped heart were waved off by the anesthesiologist, who insisted that a
lead for the cardiac monitor must have fallen off. In reality, the patient’s heart had
actually stopped (Gawande, pp. 4-6). The decision on how to process these two
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conflicting choices falls to the surgeon, who was able to arrive at a course of action by
integrating contradictory information from his operating room personnel.
Another vital part of Crew Resource Management is the idea of
leadership/followership. There needs to be “clear recognition that the command role
carries a special responsibility.” While the goal of CRM is to have the crew members
function as a single unit, they must never forget that the captain is the one who must
make the final decision. However, “the credibility of a leader is built over time and must
be accomplished through conscious effort” (CAA, 2002, Ch. 2, p. 9). Just as with the
other principles of CRM, this one can be transferred to medicine with very little effort:
while input is necessary and valuable from other members of the operating team, it is the
surgeon’s responsibility to make the best decision for the patient. As surgery cannot be
performed quickly and smoothly if a subordinate is always challenging the decisions of
the senior surgeon, it is important that the surgeon be recognized as the ultimate decision
maker.
Stress management is an area of CRM that is especially applicable to medicine,
given the issue of physician burnout. Stress management with regard to Crew Resource
Management “[refers] not only to one's ability to perceive and accommodate to stress in
others but primarily to anticipate, recognize and cope with one's own stress as well”
(CRM, 2002, Ch. 2 p. 9). Being able to recognize stress in oneself is arguably more
important than recognizing it in others, as stress may be impossible to detect in others. In
aviation, individuals who experience a decrease in their ability to perform as a result of
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stress or fatigue should be considered incapacitated and unfit-to-fly. A similar system
should be in place in medicine. Doctors who are exhibiting poor performance because of
stress or fatigue should be relieved of duty until they are back to full strength.
Aviation Safety Reporting System
In the aviation industry, the Aviation Safety Reporting System is a method for
analyzing pilot’s errors in order to see what actions the pilot could have taken to avoid
making the mistake. By being “voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive,” the ASRS
encourages pilots to self-report so that data can be collated in order to “enhance the basis
for human factors research & recommendations for future aviation procedures,
operations, facilities, and equipment. Data from this system has been used in 64
published research studies and special papers; additionally, all reports are published (with
identifying information removed) for review by any interested parties. Finally, analysis
of data can reveal problems with equipment or procedures that can be addressed
immediately via monthly “Alert Bulletins” (ASRS Program Overview, date unkown, pp.
5, 23).
It is safe to say that a similar system would be met with resistance, if not open
hostility, if it was introduced into the medical industry. Doctors would perceive it as
nothing more than a way to open themselves up to more opportunities for litigation. In
order to make it acceptable to them, all possible identifying information would have to be
scrubbed from the reports; additionally, it would be necessary to assure them that any
reports that they submitted would be exempt from use in a court case. I would also
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recommend adding some sort of financial incentive to make usage more attractive. Dr.
M. Bing and I decided that the most logical method would be to have malpractice
insurers reduce their premiums for all doctors participating in the program. Doing so
would require participation on the part of the insurance companies responsible for
providing malpractice insurance to physicians. In order to accomplish this goal, it would
be necessary to prove (using statistical analyses) that doctors’ participation in an
anonymous reporting system would help lower malpractice lawsuits.
Other Solutions
Medicare and Preventable Medical Errors
In 2009, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) began refusing to
reimburse hospitals for costs associated with “conditions that could reasonably have been
prevented and serious preventable events.” These events and conditions included three
types of hospital acquired infections, as well as complications arising from objects being
left in the patient during surgery and pressure ulcers (Wachter, Foster, & Dudley, 2008,
pp. 116 and 120). Prior to this decision, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for the cost of
patient care, regardless of whether or not any errors had occurred that would increase that
cost: essentially, hospitals were receiving larger payments for procedures that involved
errors than for procedures that were error free. While the “regulation’s effect on these
events has not been well studied,” there is evidence that it was successful in reducing
central line–associated bloodstream infections by 11% and catheter-associated urinary
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tract infections by 10%. Rates of injurious falls and hospital-acquired pressure ulcers
showed no significant changes (Waters et al., 2015, pp. 347-348).
While Medicare’s nonpayment system does show improvements in some areas, it
faces several challenges. First and foremost, in order for Medicare to justify
nonpayment, the preventable medical error must be one that was actually preventable.
Infections seem to be fairly easy to prevent, with a 66% reduction in catheter-related
bloodstream infections reported when medical personnel strictly adhered to a series of
best practices. However, there is little evidence to indicate that rates of pressure ulcers,
injurious falls, blood-type mismatches, and air embolisms decrease when similar
prevention strategies are used (Wachter, Foster, & Dudley, 2008, pp. 119). Another issue
that the system faces is event severity. Currently, “the policy makes no distinction
between trivial and significant harm.” Because there is no defined difference between a
small slip-and-fall injury and a large one, there is the possibility of reduced payments for
a supposed injury that required little more than a band aid. The final problem that the
new Medicare system faces is that some conditions might be present prior to admission to
the hospital. Preexisting conditions are especially a concern for catheter-related
bloodstream infections, as they can be caused by urinary tract infections that the patient
acquired prior to his or her admission to the hospital (Wachter, Foster, & Dudley, 2008,
pp. 120).
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Another way that preventable medical errors might be reduced is through the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). While the effectiveness of the ACA
is a hotly debated issue, Section 10607 does require that the U.S. Secretary of Health and
Human Services give preference in awarding demonstration grants to states that make
proposals “that are likely to enhance patient safety by detecting, analyzing, and helping to
reduce medical errors and adverse events.” The Act also requires states that receive grant
money to submit “an annual report evaluating the effectiveness of activities funded with
grants awarded” by the HHS Secretary (ACA, 2015, pp. 867-868). However, as these
stipulations were enacted so recently (April of 2015), no efforts have been made to assess
their projected effectiveness.
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Section IV
Real World Anecdotes
Dr. Tom Gudewicz, MD
In the course of my research, I was privileged to be able to interview Dr. Tom
Gudewicz, former Force Medical Officer of the Submarine Pacific Fleet and current
surgical pathologist at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, MA. He not only
provided me with advice and direction for my thesis but also gave me insight into how
preventable medical errors affect real people.
While serving as a surgical pathologist in the US Navy, Dr. Gudewicz was placed
in charge of the pathology department at a Navy hospital. For those unfamiliar with the
field of surgical pathology, a physician in this field normally does not deal with patients
face-to-face; rather, his “patients” are tissue samples and specimens taken from
individuals undergoing surgery. The pathologist’s job is to diagnose a patient based
solely upon these samples. However, when Dr. Gudewicz first arrived at the hospital, he
was greeted by a “bucket of surgical and cytological specimens that were not accessioned
[recorded] for processing”; a number of samples were without any form of labelling,
despite explicit instructions set forth in the department’s manual (in some cases, the
specimen containers had labels that were completely blank). This situation presented a
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very obvious problem: even if he was able to diagnose a sample’s disease, how was he
supposed to notify the patient?
As the problem was caused by the clinics and offices that were sending him the
samples (entities outside of his direct control), he had to approach the problem with an
unorthodox solution. After determining that the lack of labelling was caused by a lack of
training, a lack of experience, and a lack of follow-up (on the status of the samples by
clinics), he developed a database to document the specimens that allowed him to “collect
data to analyze and generate real time ‘report cards’ by clinics/providers”; he was
subsequently able to use these report cards “to convince senior leadership to institute
system changes and training to address the issue” (Gudewicz). Although he met with
some resistance from individuals who wanted to invest in a high-tech system involving
automated labelling with database support, he was eventually able to convince the clinics
to train their personnel better: a much simpler and more effective solution.
Another area that Dr. Gudewicz was able to provide insight on was how doctors deal
with the outcomes of preventable medical errors. Simply put, he believes that the best
course of action is to tell the truth. Patient safety is taken very seriously, and they are
always looking for ways to increase it; medicine cannot advance in this goal if doctors
attempt to cover up their mistakes. Additionally, full disclosure of any medical errors has
more immediate benefits, including “salvaging trust, decreasing the likelihood of
litigation and facilitating the healing of both the patient and the provider.” However,
owning up to mistakes (especially ones that result in the loss of life or limb) is an
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incredibly difficult task. Massachusetts General Hospital works to solve this problem by
having physicians in every department who are trained to coach others through the
process of disclosure, as well as additional resources on an intranet website (Harris et al.
1955).
Dr. Paul Bing, MD
Another excellent source of information was an interview with my thesis adviser’s
younger brother, Dr. Paul Bing, MD. As a physician specializing in emergency
medicine, he has more face-to-face interactions with patients and was able to give me an
exact breakdown of how patient handoffs occur at his Nashville hospital. Earlier, I
discussed the I-PASS system, a standardized method that some hospitals use during
patient handoff. One major drawback to it, however, as pointed out by Dr. P. Bing was
that there is often too much going on in the hospital for two doctors to sit down and meet
face-to-face about every patient; additionally, he mentioned that for some patients there is
too much information to be written down, so some of it can get lost. Although there is no
standardized method in place at his hospital, Dr. P. Bing focuses on standardizing his
patient handoffs as much as possible: he covers the patient’s history, current treatment,
and recommendations for future actions. One thing that he mentioned that I had not
heard of anywhere else was a “bedside handoff.” As the name implies, a bedside handoff
is one that takes place at the patient’s bedside, allowing him to stay in the loop regarding
his treatment. While no research has been done regarding them, Dr. P. Bing believes that
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they increase patient satisfaction and have the potential to reduce preventable medical
errors.
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Section V
Conclusion
Preventable medical errors are a very tricky topic to study: hospitals are generally
opposed to researchers coming into their halls to document every mistake made.
Consequently, hard data about error rates can often be hard to come by, especially on a
national scale. Regardless, efforts must be made to analyze existing data as best as
possible in order to decrease preventable medical errors and increase patient safety.
PMEs can be divided up into two general categories: structural errors and process
errors. Structural errors are those errors that result from defects in the overall structure of
a hospital; these can include things like scheduling and hospital capacity. These errors
are generally hard to correct, as they require large sums of money to either hire new
employees or expand current facilities. Process errors involve either an action or an
inaction on the part of hospital personnel (errors of commission and omission,
respectively). These mistakes are generally harder to spot, but once they have been
recognized, they can be addressed more easily than structural errors.
While preventable medical errors can be caused my patients, I chose to focus on
those errors caused by physicians and other medical personnel. Causes for PMEs by
physicians include doctor inattentiveness, procedure complexity, inexperienced
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personnel, and failures in communication. Doctor attentiveness is primarily caused by
lack of sleep or poor scheduling. Procedure complexity is a characteristic that all
surgeries share; complexity can be mitigated by standardization using the WHO Surgical
Safety Checklist. Inexperienced doctors (like the residents who might be responsible for
the July Effect) are very hard to overcome without hands on practice; simulation
dummies can be used to provide a somewhat realistic preview. Failures in
communication were the last major causes of preventable medical errors and primarily
occurred during patient handoffs. Standardization in handoffs using the verbal I-PASS
system or digital database software can help ensure effective handoffs. Additional ways
to improve patient safety include the use of an anonymous reporting system for errors,
similar to the ASRS used in the aviation industry, as well as Crew Resource Management
to better deal with a variety of factors.
Recommendations
Preventable medical errors create a huge cost for the American people, one that
can be measured both in lives and dollars. While the Institute of Medicine’s report has
done much to alter the world of medicine, research and analysis can only do so much.
Based upon the above discussions, I have chosen to highlight the areas that I believe
would be the most beneficial in improving patient care.
First and foremost, medicine must become more standardized across all hospitals.
While each patient needs and deserves to be treated as a person, there are many aspects of
patient care that should be standardized. As mentioned above, many hospitals lack
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systematic methods for collecting and logging patient data. This situation wastes time, as
patients must be asked to repeat their histories multiple times; more importantly, it risks
patient safety. Without an organized way to collect data, healthcare professionals could
potentially miss vital information that could result in patient harm or death. Imagine if a
doctor taking a patient history forgets to ask about any allergies, but the patient has a
severe allergy to penicillin. No allergies would be noted on the patient’s record, so
anyone who subsequently dealt with him might assume that the patient had no allergies.
Another area that requires additional standardization is surgery. Undoubtedly, each case
is unique and presents difficulties that might vary wildly, but these situations are
generally the exception and not the norm. Increased use of the World Health
Organization’s Surgical Safety Checklist could reduce preventable medical errors
associated with surgery; a 2012 Johns Hopkins study found that, on average, American
surgeons “[leave] foreign object such as a sponge or a towel inside a patient’s body after
an operation 39 times a week, [perform] the wrong procedure on a patient 20 times a
week, and [operate] on the wrong body site 20 times a week.” These exact mistakes are
dealt with in the WHO’s checklist: the very first step involves patient confirmation of the
surgical site and procedure, while one of the last is an instrument, sponge, and needle
count. By taking the extra time to use the checklist, approximately 4,000 of these
preventable medical errors could be avoided every year (Johns Hopkins, 2012).
Another endeavor that I believe would contribute greatly to patient safety would
be a nationwide error reporting system, analogous to Aviation Safety Reporting System.
Undoubtedly, implementing such a system would create a firestorm of conflict among
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healthcare providers, as its stated goal would be to track the very errors that cost them
millions of dollars in malpractice suits. Therefore, efforts must be made to strip the
results of any type of identifying information as thoroughly as possible, while still
retaining the data necessary for performing useful analyses. In order to make the deal
more attractive to physicians, I would also propose tying participation in the program to a
tangible benefit, like discounted malpractice insurance. While initial participation in the
system would be low, if tangible improvements to patient safety can be made, doctors
would be going against their very jobs by refusing to participate. By collating
information from the system, researchers could attempt to find patterns in the breakdown
of patient care. For example, if structural errors (those errors associated with availability
of staff and equipment) were found to occur at similar times every week, hospital
administrators could be advised to increase the number of doctors or nurses on staff at
those hours.
A third area that should be developed to increase patient safety is education of
healthcare providers on the topics of preventable medical errors and their causes.
Doctors and nurses can hardly be expected to work to correct an issue that they know
nothing about. This method, too, would meet with pushback from the medical
community. Mistakes are a hard topic to talk about; mistakes involving the loss of
human life are even harder. Education would also help to improve the problem of doctor
fatigue: by showing doctors how detrimental their exhaustion is to patient safety, the
culture of indoctrination via overwork can be dismantled.
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